The empire of Europe: the imperial problem and the construction of Europe

The empire of Europe: the imperial problem and the construction of Europe

Frédéric Kisters

Source: https://www.voxnr.fr/lempire-deurope-la-problematique-imperiale-et-la-construction-europeenne

Europe aspires to Empire" (Jean-Louis Feuerbach)

PROLEGOMENES

Anyone familiar with history knows that empires have played an essential role in the evolution of mankind. Between 50 and 200 AD, four empires encompassed the whole of the civilised world: Rome, the Arsacid Parthians, Kushan and the Eastern Han State formed an unbroken chain from Britain to the China Sea, around and around which only barbarians lived.

So a historian such as Toynbee (in picture), in his "Great Adventure of Mankind", wanted to show how we gradually moved from an era of local civilisations (which were usually empires) to a universal whole, how the oekoumen eventually covered the whole earth. He begins by presenting the first civilisations, which were isolated and had almost no contact with each other. He then goes on to show how the expanding empires came into contact with each other and thus influenced each other. The process continued until Modern Times, when all civilisations were linked. The Empire was therefore the main agent for the spread of civilisations(1).

The sociologist and historian Wallerstein (in picture), on the other hand, contrasts politically unified empires with the "world economies" overlying a group of states of varying strength, such as the Mediterranean from the 7th to the 2nd century BC before it was unified by Rome, or the later Mediterranean, which covered the same area and to which Fernand Braudel (in picture) devoted his masterpiece (14th-16th AD). Before Modern Times, most of the world's economies either became empires or were swallowed up by one of them. Capitalism, on the other hand, the culmination of world economies, has survived for five centuries because it extends over almost the entire globe: it "is based on the constant assumption of economic losses by political entities, while economic profit is distributed to 'private' interests"(2). Capitalism towers above all existing empires. Even the USSR, which was trying to escape it, had to take this into account. He concluded that only the establishment of a universal socialist empire could put an end to capitalism.

The term empire comes from the Latin word imperium (the authority of military command, even by coercion, complemented by potestas, authority by force of values). The emperor combined a number of powers previously exercised by different magistrates (consuls, censors, tribunes and the grand pontiff) and granted on a life-long basis. He was proclaimed imperator by the soldiers (the people in arms). Unlike the proconsular imperium, the emperor's imperium was unlimited in time and space and was subordinate to no other. His power was based on his clientele, his personal fortune, the oath of allegiance and his auctoritas (moral pre-eminence) (3).

Later, as European hegemony spread across the globe, we attributed the name of empire to a number of states, past or present, which bore some resemblance to what we had known, in the manner of the Greeks who gave foreign gods names from their pantheon, even if this meant committing a few inaccuracies. As a result, some authors distinguish between two kinds of empire: the European line descended from the principate and the "foreigners". In fact, we could also conceive of a Chinese lineage, a lineage of Mesopotamian empires etc...

But, leaving aside the singular forms, we will address the figure of the Empire as an archetype that has been constantly appearing in new guises since the dawn of history (4).

TYPOLOGY

Like the legal historian John Gilissen, we distinguish two meanings of the term Empire: in the strict sense, it refers to a form of government dominated by the figure of an autocrat bearing the title of emperor or some other equivalent (pharaoh, great khan, king of kings, etc.); in the lato sense, Empire metaphorically refers to any vast and powerful state, whatever its mode of government. As many empires stricto sensu have not consistently earned the title of great power during their formal lifetime, these states can be divided into three categories:

- empires lato sensu or great powers;
- empires stricto sensu which were at one time or another great powers;
- empires stricto sensu that remained or became small or medium-sized states.

Consequently, we will consider, for example, that Republican Rome fell into the first category after the Second Punic War and passed into the second under Augustus. As for the late Western Empire, it belonged to the third group.

In addition to the difference between empires stricto sensu and lato sensu, there is a classification by type, the number and nature of which vary from one author to another. Although the typology of empires seems secondary to us, we have played a logical game. For our part, we have proceeded by a series of antinomies: we contrast land-based or continental empires with maritime empires; centralised empires with the loosest; long-lived empires, often linked to a dynasty or a succession of dynasties; and ephemeral empires, most often the work of great conquerors. The result is eight possible associations that give a fairly accurate picture of the characteristics of the different types of empire:

1) terrestrial/centralised/ephemeral. Example: Napoleon I
2) terrestrial/centralised/durable. Example: Rome in the Late Empire
3) terrestrial/decentralised/ephemeral. Example: of conquest
4) terrestrial/decentralised/sustainable. Example: Sargon's Akkad (-2340), Rome of the High Empire
5) maritime/centralised/ephemeral. Example: Japan in the 20th century
6) maritime/centralised/sustainable. Example: Athens (479-404 BC)
7) maritime/decentralised/ephemeral. Example: Knut the Great's empire (1013-1033)
8) maritime/decentralised/sustainable. Example: Spanish and Portuguese empires

For greater precision, we have added two sub-categories to the above classes. Among the empires of conquest, we feel we should distinguish those founded by nomadic peoples. Similarly, we will separate feudal empires, such as that of the Plantagenets, from "lasting decentralised empires".

This classification does not erase the idiosyncrasies of empires, but it does allow us to glimpse, through the teeming mists of events, the imprecise contours of a perennial figure.

BIRTH

Empires are most often formed on the fantasised model of one of their predecessors. The archetype is reproduced throughout history in a process that Spengler called pseudomorphosis. For Europeans, the notion of Empire necessarily evokes the Roman principate. From the principate flows, like a river gushing from the mountains, a course punctuated by empires (Roman, Byzantine, Carolingian, SERNG, the two Bonapartist empires, the Tsars; we could also take the succession of Chinese empires as an example) (5).

Imperialism is both a permanent feature of empire and a necessary condition for its birth. It takes two forms. By far the most common is martial, brutal power. A people imposes its domination on its neighbours. But other empires were formed more peacefully by a kind of synoecism, such as that of Charles V, which was more the result of a long theory of matrimonial alliances than of conquests.

Obviously, the will to dominate cannot be achieved without superiority, be it technological, organisational, demographic, moral or other. But these instruments in turn depend in part on the energy that drives them. Man invents to enslave his fellow creatures or Nature. But if the will to power did not dominate him, he would not create. Imperialism therefore generates the means for its own realisation.

Even when the Empire is formed by free association, the will to power and expansion are nonetheless necessary premises: people come together to protect themselves, but above all to dominate.

The presence of a threat also favoured the formation or maintenance of the Empire. People join forces to fight a common enemy, but above all it encourages the old empires to maintain and strengthen their cohesion.

By naming its enemy, which will sometimes be another empire, it defines itself negatively, naming what it does not wish to become and refusing to let others interfere in its domain.

It should be emphasised that, unlike the Schmittian Grossraum, the Empire is not content to suppress intervention by outside powers: it asserts itself to be a predator!

The name of the Empire is often attached to that of its founder. These are usually states whose boundaries were carved out with swords. Their names evoke fantastic but brief epics. Great figures also emerge from the history of empires that formed more slowly or were not monocracies. In order to endure, an empire must build up an elite government to ensure the continuity of its policies.

Empires are often formed by peoples who have reached a moment of "biological power". This somewhat romantic expression covers and expresses an extraordinary and complex combination of factors that at one time, in the space of a generation, gave a people the power to expand. Some of these causes are objective: a large population, superior technology, institutions adapted to the situation... but most of them are subjective and unspeakable: energy, faith in destiny, the conviction of racial, cultural or religious superiority. This is how we saw the small Macedonian people conquer the immense Persian empire or a few hundred conquistadors destroy the Inca and Maya nations.

In our view, the need for economic expansion is secondary, since it stems from the desire to dominate, of which economics is only one aspect. Those who only want to amass wealth turn away from the Empire and invest their efforts in the world economy. It should be remembered, however, that continental empires seek autarky or at least independence, while maritime powers develop free trade. In both cases, however, they are political bodies; the world economy, on the other hand, is economic, aiming not to govern but to profit.

EMPIRE AND THE STATE

The Empire and the State are brothers but not twins. Both the State and the Empire make a clear distinction between the internal and the external; they delimit their territories by borders and do not tolerate any interference from foreign powers. If the State is a work of Reason, the Empire is the result of History. The centralising State combats all competing spheres: local freedoms, personal, feudal or denominational powers. It establishes a single law, valid everywhere it controls. For the State, legality takes precedence over legitimacy. While disputes over legitimacy impede the normal functioning of the Empire, they do not impede the State bureaucracy, which operates in the legal mode. The Empire differs from the State in two other essential respects: on the one hand, it combats privileges and customs only insofar as they threaten its integrity; while it establishes a uniform public law, it leaves it up to the people to choose their private law; on the other hand, the Empire, unlike the State, accepts that its authority varies in intensity from one country to another (6).

Today, the State model is outdated for a number of reasons:
- the myth of the State is dying; it is no longer animated by the faith of the revolutionaries of 1789 and their 19th century successors;
- the State is crumbling, and spheres of power and interest are multiplying;
- As a result, control of politics no longer lies with the State, but with international organisations, capitalist forces and the great powers on the outside, and with political parties and pressure groups on the inside;
- The State, in this world without borders, has become too small an entity (7).

Empire, by definition, recognises no higher authority. Even in the religious sphere, it resists the clergy, as the Ghibellines did. Indeed, the Empire is also part of the sacred, when the emperor is not himself a god! Louis XIV is said to have said "I am the State", while an emperor would declare "I am God". The Empire does not tolerate any interference from foreign powers, be they temporal or spiritual, in its internal affairs or sphere of influence (the interventions of the USA in Grenada or Panama are a continuation of this logic). But this refusal to submit to a superior or even equal authority is not enough to legitimise sovereignty. In fact, as Julien Freund wrote in his masterpiece: "the politically sovereign is not the authority which in principle is not subordinate to any superior will, but the authority which makes itself the absolute will by dominating competition". In all circumstances, even the most desperate, the Empire claims prepotency.

UNIVERSALISM AND CIVILISATION

It aims for local hegemony and even universalism. A healthy empire wants to constantly extend its domination and influence. The desire to extend is manifested in two ways: either the empire controls a vast but limited geographical area, or it strives for universality. I would call the latter category "messianic empires", because the idea of world conquest is of Christian origin.

Indeed, it was the Stoic school that developed the idea of Rome's universalism, but the philosophers conceived of it as "the whole of the human community that participates in Reason (oekoumene)", as opposed to the barbarian world. In this limited sense, the Roman Empire was indeed universal. The idea was reinforced by Christianity. In the fourth century, Roman and Christian civilisations were one and the same. God protected the Empire. Unsympathetic to Roman universalism, the barbarians were more receptive to Christian universalism. In the Middle Ages, the coexistence of the Byzantine Empire and a Western Empire was the very negation of the principle of Roman universalism. What's more, Charlemagne's possessions never encompassed all Christian lands, whereas the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic Nation extended beyond the limits of the defunct Roman Empire. Christian universalism, understood as "all believing states", had no institutional unity. And none of the Christian empires was anchored in Rome. The strength of the imperial idea lay in the sacred character conferred by the institution, but the sacredness was granted by the Church, whereas previously the Empire had been sacred in itself (8). Nevertheless, even if it (pre)tends towards universality, the Empire is always linked to a place. Like any legal order, it is situated. The Empire, before being an idea, is a territory. Its propensity to draw borders is a clear and visible sign of this (9).

What's more, the expansion of the Empire is correlated with that of a civilisation. Notwithstanding the nomadic peoples who, although they were not the bearers of a civilisation - although they did have a culture - were nonetheless the medium between civilisations whose borders were not shared: thus, the empire of Genghis Khan linked Christian Europe, the East, India and China. The Empire is more than a State; it is a state of mind. It was conceived as a space of order and reason surrounded by barbarians. Imperium enabled conquest, while potestas ensured the preservation of acquired territories. Although the Empire most often imposed its hold through power, it only perpetuated itself by embodying a civilisation. It is built around a myth. By doing so, it established its identity and that of its peoples. A community of culture and destiny was soon born (10).

The Empire, which comprised a multiplicity of ethnic groups, was governed by a caste that did not depend on the local population. Its bureaucracy was non-hereditary. This is why the ruler often surrounded himself with eunuchs deprived of descendants or freedmen entirely devoted to their master. Even feudal empires tried to create a non-hereditary governing elite: the first feudal fiefs and Turkish timars were not part of the family patrimony, but were granted by the sovereign in exchange for services; in the Carolingian Empire, the vassalage oath (a personal bond) reinforced allegiance to the State (more abstract) without replacing it (11). This governing elite would be the bearers of imperial civilisation.

Finally, it should be noted that the imperial system is difficult to reconcile with democracy, especially parliamentary democracy. Nevertheless, the Empire is not necessarily a monocracy; a concentration of power is sufficient (oligarchy, aristocracy, etc.).

SPACE AND DURATION

The dimensions of the Empire are difficult to assess. Jean Thiriart noted that the minimum size varied from period to period. The largest countries could be crossed in 40 to 60 days. The mode of transport then determined the size (the messengers of the Han empire reached the borders of the empire in 6 weeks, the sailors of Charles V a few weeks to go to the Americas). From then on, minimum and maximum were impossible to determine: the Mongol conquests and the possessions of Charlemagne were called an empire. It would seem, then, that being a larger state than the others at a given time and in a given area is enough to merit the title of empire.

Because of its size, the Empire brought together diverse peoples, which encouraged the government to respect regional particularities and religious tolerance (the persecution of Christians was due to their intransigence and arrogance, which threatened the imperial order). But, by a natural process, local cultures gradually became distorted in favour of an eminent imperial civilisation. The Empire needed to expand, but it had to maintain a certain homogeneity: it encompassed a multiplicity of peoples, but they had to share the greatest number of common values: ideological, religious, institutional or linguistic...

Obviously, religious, linguistic or cultural unity can go some way to compensating for the composite nature of the Empire. Imperial culture often belongs to - and is created by - a governing elite (Roman culture, Confucianism, etc.). Within the Empire, there is a perpetual tension between the ethnic groups and the central state. The Empire survives as long as it maintains its cohesion, the region as long as it maintains its identity.

The notion of duration is even more difficult to define. On the one hand, an empire is meant to be eternal; on the other, many empires have collapsed within a few years of their birth. This is particularly true of empires built by great warlords and nomadic peoples (Alexander, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, Attila, etc.). Duration in itself is therefore of little importance; it is more a mark of success than a characteristic of the Empire itself. Nevertheless, the ages determine two main types of empire: those that have not had time to structure themselves and the others. Some might call them aborted empires, but their sheer number and influence in history means we can't dismiss them.

THE DEATH OF EMPIRE

According to Wallerstein, centralisation is both its strength and its weakness, because on the one hand it allows surplus wealth to be attracted to the centre, but on the other it induces a certain rigidity, a conservatism that can go so far as to reject technological change. When the bureaucratic apparatus scleroses, it absorbs too much of the money raised, and the government loses the room for manoeuvre it needs to achieve its political and strategic objectives(12).

For Gilissen, on the other hand, the causes of the Empire's decline were more or less the same as those that led to its formation.

Firstly, there was the "retreat of aggressiveness", or, if you prefer, of imperialism. A series of military defeats resulting from a relative decline in technology, internal dissensions, administrative disorders or the incapacity of warlords, lead the Empire towards its end.

By its very nature, a mature Empire tends to remain on the defensive. So internal conflicts often take precedence over wars with the outside world.

In the case of empires formed by rapid conquest, it is often the leader's megalomania that leads to their ruin; when ambition exceeds means. The example of Alexander the Great is typical. His father, Philip, would probably have confined himself to conquering Anatolia, Syria and perhaps Egypt, but he would not have penetrated any further into the heart of the Achaemenid Empire. In so doing, his empire would have been less labile; it would have made up in duration for what it lost in space. But in fact, without this great adventure, Hellenistic culture would never have reached the Indus basin.

The Empire also often suffered from wars of succession. Either the state was weakened, or the heirs divided up the territories (Charlemagne). What's more, no dynasty escaped genetic degeneration. Some states practise other methods of succession, but they do not always succeed in renewing the ruling elite.

Subjugated peoples revolt, either because they fear that their culture will be eradicated in favour of the imperial civilisation or that of the dominant people in the Empire, or because the maintenance of the central state is becoming too onerous in relation to the services it provides (maintaining order, justice, infrastructure, etc.). The Empire could be perceived as "ethnicide". Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire failed to assimilate the various nationalities that made them up, with each ethnic group demanding the creation of a nation state. The colonial empires disintegrated because the Metropolis exploited them without much in return (independence of the United States).

During its downward phase, the empire often becomes feudal, but this is not always a sign of decadence; feudal empires have in fact existed.

When the dominant people weaken, their privileged position is challenged; if they cling to their advantages when they are no longer able to fulfil their obligations, the Empire will disintegrate. But in many empires, a degree of assimilation having been achieved, the dominant ethnic group may be replaced by a competing ethnic group or by a cosmopolitan caste entirely devoted to the cause of the federal state.

Disorder in the administration is often cited as the cause of the Empire's decline, but it seems to us that it is more a consequence of the previous points. Similarly, economic decline is most often explained by technological decline, internal unrest, poor management, a lack of dynamism and often a bipolarisation of society into a mass of hard-working serfs and a few large landowners, resulting in the disappearance of the free men who provided taxpayers and recruits for the army.

EUROPE (13)

Europe has always been divided linguistically and politically, but it shares a common cultural heritage: the Greco-Latin and then Christian civilisations. The geographer Pieter Saey, who contributed to the collective work on the great myths of Belgian history edited by Anne Morelli, denies that Europe is a continent. He also denies that Europe is a unified cultural space, because a supranational culture has yet to be created. Nevertheless, he identifies four historical motives that have encouraged the emergence of a supranational consciousness: defence against the Turks (a motivation that could come back to the fore in the form of Islamic fundamentalism), the domination of one power over the others (respect for the European balance), the maintenance of peace, and the need for market enlargement (which is insufficient in itself to forge a European idea). The author concludes: "The definition of this (=the European spirit) has varied according to the realities that the authors had in front of them and has no continuity. Nor do the various definitions of historical and geographical Europe have any continuity over time (14). In support of his thesis, he proposes a series of maps showing the different forms that Europe has taken over the course of its history. In fact, depending on the period considered or the authors chosen, Europe changes considerably in size and shape: sometimes it is reduced to the world of classical Greece, sometimes it extends to the Christian world or encompasses Celtic civilisation... With these remarks, Mr Saey hopes to prevent a European myth from replacing the national myth, because he is probably a follower of universalism. In fact, his contribution concludes the book edited by Anne Morelli, which is not without reason (15).

Some people do not seem to want to understand that Europe and the Empire are dynamic concepts, which do not have definitively fixed limits. To the mutability of Europe in space, we contrast the permanence of the idea of Empire in time. Since the deposition of Romulus Augustus, Empire and Europe have no longer coincided. Our continent will regain its power when it once again achieves a balance between its territory and its civilisation.

"The Empire is not a democracy", some good souls will whine... In fact, as the philosophers of the Enlightenment and the great jurists of the 17th century pointed out, democracy is only suitable for small states. This does not prevent it from existing within the Empire, at a local level. We can easily imagine a powerful, aristocratic (in the etymological sense) state at the centre, with responsibility for foreign policy, the army and major economic issues... and, on the periphery, regions with responsibility for education, culture and local administration. What's more, as Jean Thiriart wrote, "Freedom (real, not formal) is directly proportional to the power of one's homeland". The citizens of a subjugated nation are serfs, whatever the form of government; they are not free if an outside power imposes a way of thinking and acting on them.

OUR ENEMIES

Let us ask ourselves, quite apart from any moral considerations, whether Europe possesses the means of greatness. Broadly speaking, we can say that the determining factors are military strength, industrial potential or wealth, population and surface area. When seen as a coherent whole, Europe has all these elements. Only two other poles enjoy comparable advantages: the United States and Japan (16) (and Japan lacks surface area). The CIS is out of the race for a long time and China has not yet reached a sufficient degree of development, but in the future we will no doubt have to reckon with these two second-tier players.

The European Empire, in the lato-sensu sense, would logically follow in the Roman footsteps. There were several threats that encouraged it to form: the Muslim barbarians (17), the mercantile barbarians, and its two competing poles. It is only by naming its enemies that Europe will recover its destiny.

Fundamentalist Muslims are not yet a serious military threat, but they do represent a factor of unrest on Europe's southern frontier and within its own borders. Remember that Islamist movements are partly financed by the United States, our other enemy.

By "mercantile barbarians" we mean international speculators, those who play the casino economy, against whom Europe must protect itself.

Japan has increased its weight by joining forces with the "small Asian dragons" within ASENA. But the group lacks political cohesion. ASENA's members include ex-communist Vietnam, which, frightened by Chinese rearmament, is looking for allies. The smaller member countries have grown faster than Japan, which has thus lost its absolute pre-eminence within ASENA. It is likely that Japan will try to extend its influence towards the Russian steppes, which are teeming with raw materials. It will then enter a race with Europe and perhaps China, whose attitude will be decisive for the balance of the region. Will it compete with Japan or ally itself with it?

The United States has unique characteristics: it was not formed from a group of historical communities, but from a magma of individuals from the four corners of the world. Their culture is the result of a syncretism of imported values. This culture is seen as a commercial object, a means of ensuring that others end up like them by buying their products. While the Empire sought distinction, the United States aimed assimilation. Its strategy merges with that of the global economy.

OUR PAST AND OUR FUTURE

Empire is the means of overcoming nation and region. It is the only myth capable of forging a European patriotism. But too many regionalists want to create mini nation-states. Yet the twenty-first century will be the era of large entities. But the nation state desires equality, uniformity and centralisation. It establishes a single law throughout its territory. The Empire, on the other hand, did not have equal authority in all its regions. Some regions may have special, temporary or permanent status. Thus, in the Roman Empire, Roman law was superimposed on local laws without eliminating them. Of course, public law was unified, but in private matters, citizens had recourse to Roman law or local law, depending on the case. The habits and customs of the various ethnic groups were thus preserved. The existence of intermediate statutes facilitated the integration of new countries: some, who would have refused immediate integration, would nevertheless accept a gentler procedure that allowed for a period of adaptation. As for the resolution of ethnic conflicts by the Empire, this is both a duty and a necessity. In an imperial model, the question of armed intervention in Yugoslavia would not have arisen. Whether the region was on the edge of the Empire or inside it, its legions would have marched in immediately.

We are witnessing a new phenomenon: a group of nation states are trying to unite. But liberal ideology is pushing for a minimalist Europe, a confederation; yet the Empire needs a unifying, aggregating centre, a massive core.

The example of Austria-Hungary is of particular interest to us, because it is similar to the European situation in a number of ways. Firstly, its formation process: it was formed by the peaceful aggregation of a group of principalities as they were inherited by the Habsburg family. But it broke up under pressure from various ethnic groups who, infested by liberal ideology, demanded the creation of nation states. For several decades, Austria-Hungary was even a two-headed state. Cisleithania and Transleithania shared a common sovereign who was enthroned twice. But the two parts of the Empire were governed according to a state logic that contradicted the notion of Empire. They were not a collection of ethnic groups subservient to the emperor, but a confederation of two states, which were themselves not very homogeneous. One was dominated by Germans, the other by Hungarians, but each included numerous minority peoples. The Germans granted them self-determination, but they themselves had no state of their own, while the Hungarians had one that included other ethnic groups whose rights to autonomy were not recognised. In fact, the Empire might well have continued after the First World War had the Allies not decided otherwise. The establishment of a pax austria would have prevented many Balkan wars. We are still paying for the treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain, which divided Europe (18).

European integration necessarily involves destroying the old nation states. Two processes are conceivable; the first, gentle, would consist of the gradual devolution of their competences to Europe and the regions; the second, brutal, could occur if our politicians persevere in their blindness: the piece-by-piece break-up of the Community, like the former Czechoslovakia.

Who will build this Europe? As is so often the case, our politicians are as generous in their words as they are stingy in their deeds. We know a caste of European civil servants, but most of them want a single market rather than a political Europe, a world economy rather than an empire! What's more, the will to recognise the enemy does not yet exist.

Nor should we count on the electorate. People are naturally suspicious of change and the unknown. As long as they retain some hope in the current system, as long as they fail to discern the root causes of the crisis, and as long as they fear losing the meagre income that the state still provides, they will not revolt. However, they will not defend the system they are dissatisfied with either. Since, in their minds, open revolt is out of the question, some express their disapproval by voting. But among the same people, you will find very few who will agree to sign the list of candidates for a small protest or revolutionary list. Alone in the secrecy and anonymity of the polling booth, they dare to reveal their feelings. Unfortunately, statistical results have never changed the course of history. What's more, the only thing most people know about Europe today are the restrictive regulations, the relocations and mergers of companies, and the "budget convergence plans" to create the single currency. Nothing that would arouse the enthusiasm of the masses.

In fact, Europe will only become a reality on the brink of the abyss, when it appears to be the last resort. It will be a work of history, not of reason. But before that happens, a party, a European order, will have to be formed, because when the time comes, events will be happening so fast that no group will have the time it needs to structure itself. The French Revolution is a good example of the drift towards chaos. A small, determined and well-organised group can achieve great success, especially when an ever-growing majority of the population is apathetic. So let's steel our weapons until the time is right.

Frédéric KISTERS

1- TOYNBEE (Arnold), The Great Adventure of Mankind, Paris, 1994 (1st English ed. 1976), 565 p.
2 - WALLERSTEIN (I.), Capitalisme et économie-monde (1460-1640), Paris, 1980, t. I, p. 313.
3 - JACQUES and SCHEID (John), Rome et l'intégration de l'Empire, Paris, 1992 (2nd ed.), p. 29-37 and bibliography p. XXII-XXV (n°246 to 322).
4 - This article owes much to GILISSEN (John), Les Grands Empires. La notion d'empire dans l'histoire universelle, Bruxelles, Editions de la Librairie encyclopédique, 1973, p. 759-885 (Recueil de la Société Jean Bodin pour l'histoire comparative des institutions, XXXI) which is the conclusion and synthesis of a symposium organised by the same society in 1971. There are also many similarities between the idea of Empire and the Grossraum concept developed by Carl Schmitt: FEUERBACH (Jean-Louis), La théorie du Grossraum chez Carl Schmitt, in Complexio oppositorum. Uber Carl Schmitt, ed. Helmuth Quaritsch, Berlin, (1986), pp. 401-418. Nevertheless, while every empire has a Grossraum, the Grossraum does not merge with the Empire; the Grossraum extends beyond the borders of the Empire.
5 - Remark by Alain Besançon at a conference: Le concept d'empire, dir Maurice Duverger, Paris, PUF, 1980, p. 482-483 (Centre d'analyse comparative des systèmes politiques).
FREUND (Julien), L'essence du politique, Paris, 1986 (1st ed. 1965), p. 558ff.
6 - FEUERBACH (Jean-Louis), op. cit, p. 404; THIRIART (Jean), La grande nation européenne. L'Europe unitaire. Definition of European Communitarianism, S.L., 1964, passim.
7 - FREUND (Julien), op. cit, p. 129.
8 - FOLZ (R.), L'idée d'empire en Occident. Du Ve au XIVe siècles, Paris, 1953, 251 p. (Collection historique).
9 - Jean-Louis FEUERBACH writes on this subject: "A Grossraum must first carve out a unifying space (...)", op. cit. p. 406-407. On the notion of frontier in the Roman mind, see WHITTAKER (C.R.), Frontiers of the Roman Empire. A Social and Economic Study, Baltimore-London, 1994, XVI-340 p. and Frontières d'Empire. Nature et significations des frontières romaines. Acte de la table ronde internationale de nemours, 1992, Nemours, 1993, 157 p. (Mémoires du Musée de la préhistoire d'Ile-de-France, 5).
10 - " L'Empire est (ici) à la fois une communauté de culture et une communauté de destin " THIRIART (Jean), La grande nation. L'Europe unitaire. Definition of European national communitarianism, Brussels, Machiavelli, 1992 (3rd ed.), (new) thesis 34.
11 - WERNER (K.F.), L'Empire carolingien et le Saint Empire, in Le concept d'Empire, dir. M. Duverger, Paris, 1980, p. 151-198.
12 - WALLERSTEIN, op. cit. p. 19-20.
13 - See also LOHAUSEN (General Jordis von), Reich Europa (The European Empire), published in Nation Europa, May-June 1981; translation and French edition: SAUVEUR (Yannick), Jean Thiriart et le national-communautarisme-européen, Charleroi, Machiavel, 1984, p. 213-229.
14 - SAEY (Pieter), Les frontières, l'ancienneté et la nature de l'Europe, in Les grands mythes de l'histoire de Belgique, de Flandre et de Wallonie, ed. Anne Morelli, Brussels, EVO, 1995, p. 293-308.
15 - Idem, p. 307-308.
16 - We have already had occasion to criticise the collective work edited by Anne MORELLI: KISTERS (Frédéric), A propos des " grands mythes de l'histoire de Belgique " d'anne Morelli. L'histoire manipulée, in Nation Europe, n° 6, 1996, p. 23-25.
17 - KISTERS (Frédéric), L'Europe dans le monde tripolaire, in Vouloir, n°1(AS 114/118), 1994, p. 45-53. "Barbaric' in the sense of foreign to the Empire and its civilisation.
18 - BEHAR (Pierre), L'Autriche-Hongrie, idée d'avenir : permanences géopolitiques de l'Europe centrale et balkanique, Paris, 1991, 187 p. (Le Bon Sens); FEJTÖ (François), Requiem pour un empire défunt: histoire de la destruction de l'Autriche-Hongrie, s.l., 1988, 436 p.